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9 April 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

Political Developments in South Vietnam: [The use of troops to reassert Saigon's authority over Da Nang is reportedly still being planned, but precise timing and government resolve remain uncertain.]

[A meeting of the military Directorate in Saigon yesterday decided to reinforce loyal units now at Da Nang air base with two additional Ranger battalions to be airlifted by Vietnamese planes. However, both battalions are still in the vicinity of Saigon, and one is being detailed to anti-riot duty in the capital.]

[In a further step, the Directorate agreed to relieve General Chuan of command in I Corps with General Ton That Dinh, one of the prominent members of the former Minh junta and a native of Hue who has been serving in a minor post since early 1964. Dinh arrived in Da Nang today with the chief of the Joint General Staff, General Vien, who is to command the move on the city. Dinh, however, reportedly has asked Saigon to delay sending more troops until he has assessed the situation.]

[Antigovernment elements in Da Nang have been reinforced during the past 24 hours, with at least one seven-vehicle convoy bearing troops noted entering the city by US air observers. This may have been part of a national police company or a 120-man student "suicide" company reportedly being sent from Hue to help defend Da Nang. Previously, a regular army battalion and two Ranger companies were on hand. The chief of the government's Military Security Service reports that the dissidents control 17 light tanks plus some 3,000 armed youths.]

(continued)

Saigon yesterday was again the scene of violence, much of it directed against Americans, by gangs of young hoodlums roaming the city. One American was reported wounded by gunfire, and there were also two grenade incidents near US installations, injuring five Americans and several Vietnamese. Although firm details are lacking, the explosions appear to have been the work of Viet Cong agents, who may also be prevalent among the demonstrators.

There are further reports that militant refugee Catholics are preparing some early counteractions in the Saigon area.

Officials in Saigon, meanwhile, are making plans to convene a national political conference by approximately the middle of next week. Invitations are being addressed to some 150-200 persons, including representatives of the provincial and municipal councils and of the Buddhist Institute. Participation by the Buddhists is highly improbable, and the government fears it may have a problem in getting any sizable response.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No significant new military developments have been reported in the past 24 hours.

Communist Political Developments: Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi's remarks on Vietnam to Pakistani President Ayub Khan in late March appear calculated to convey the impression that Peking is taking a "responsible" position in Southeast Asia and is ready for a long struggle. Liu reportedly declared that the Chinese have no intention of intervening with troops in Vietnam or Laos but will continue to give military aid to all "wars of national liberation."

According to the Pakistani foreign minister, who talked to US officials on 7 April, Liu said that Hanoi has not asked for Chinese troop support. He added, however, that if the North Vietnamese encountered serious difficulties as a result of US attacks and asked for direct Chinese intervention, China "will oblige fully." This is a restatement of the pledge Peking first made publicly last spring and represents no expansion of the Chinese commitment to aid Vietnam.

Liu is also reported to have emphasized that a peaceful settlement in Vietnam was possible only on the basis of Hanoi's four-point formula.

CHANGES IN SOVIET PARTY RULING BODIES AT 23rd CONGRESS, 8 APRIL 1966

PRESIDIUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE Title changed POLITBURO OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Members

BREZHNEV-----		BREZHNEV-----
KOSYGIN-----		KOSYGIN-----
PODGORNÝ-----		PODGORNÝ-----
SUSLOV-----		SUSLOV-----
VORONOV-----		VORONOV-----
KIRILENKO-----		KIRILENKO-----
SHELEPIN-----		SHELEPIN-----
MAZUROV-----		MAZUROV-----
POLYANSKY-----		POLYANSKY-----
SHELEST-----		SHELEST-----
SHVERNIK-----	Replaced By	PELSHE-----
MIKOYAN-----	Dropped	

Candidates

DEMICHÉV-----		DEMICHÉV-----
GRISHIN-----		GRISHIN-----
MZHAVANADZE-----		MZHAVANADZE-----
RASHIDOV-----		RASHIDOV-----
USTINOV-----		ÜSTINOV-----
SHCHERBITSKY-----		SHCHERBITSKY-----
YEFREMOV-----	Dropped	KUNAYEV-----
	Added -----	MASHEROV-----
	Added -----	

SECRETARIAT OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

First Secretary ----- Title changed BREZHNEV-----

Secretaries

SUSLOV-----		SUSLOV-----
SHELEPIN-----		SHELEPIN-----
	Added -----	KIRILENKO-----
DEMICHÉV-----		DEMICHÉV-----
USTINOV-----		USTINOV-----
ANDROPOV-----		ANDROPOV-----
PONOMAREV-----		PONOMAREV-----
KAPITONOV-----		KAPITONOV-----
KULAKOV-----		KULAKOV-----
RUDAKOV-----		RUDAKOV-----
PODGORNÝ-----	Dropped	

SECRETARIAT OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

General Secretary
BREZHNEV-----

Secretaries

SUSLOV-----	
SHELEPIN-----	
	Added -----
KIRILENKO-----	
DEMICHÉV-----	
USTINOV-----	
ANDROPOV-----	
PONOMAREV-----	
KAPITONOV-----	
KULAKOV-----	
RUDAKOV-----	

USSR: The composition of the new politburo and secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party indicates that the power balance within the leadership remains substantially unaltered, although the position of the orthodox faction seems to have been slightly improved.

As expected, Brezhnev received the title of general secretary and emerged from the party congress with enhanced prestige. The protocol treatment accorded Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov, as well as Brezhnev, appears intended to point up the importance attached to experience and to convey an impression of a stable collective leadership around this hard core. The two old party veterans, Mikoyan and Shvernik, were retired, and greater emphasis was put on regional representation by the addition of three republic party bosses to the politburo.

In general, the changes are in keeping with the stress at the congress on the need for greater discipline and ideological firmness. It appears that some issues, such as the treatment of Stalin and the role of the party in the life of the country, have not been resolved and that various members of the leadership have, for now, agreed to disagree.

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West Germany: Despite the conciliatory tone of Bonn's recent cabinet statement, difficult problems remain in working out an acceptable arrangement for the maintenance of French forces in Germany after their removal from NATO command on 1 July.

Foreign Minister Schroeder told Ambassador McGhee that the cabinet has accepted his ministry's position that French forces cannot remain merely on the basis of the 1954 convention once "integration is broken up." Bonn believes it would be an infringement on German sovereignty for French forces to stay under a purely national command.

Bonn will also require that the peacetime mission of French forces be clearly defined and that in the event of war, they be reintegrated under NATO command. Despite initial reservations, the Germans apparently are prepared--as the cabinet statement indicated--to engage in exploratory discussions with the French regarding these questions. The first opportunity for such talks will be Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's 18 April visit to Bonn, a scheduled meeting under the 1963 Franco-German Friendship Treaty.

Although hard problems remain, there is considerable public sentiment for retaining French forces and, given the strong German aversion to a final break with France, pressures for compromise are likely to mount as the talks progress.

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Common Market: [The limited progress made at the 4-5 April council meeting suggests some easing of the situation in the Common Market, but extremely critical bargaining will continue in the next few weeks.]


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[Some community observers are expressing relief that the meeting went as well as it did, and the US mission takes the view that the French in particular are extremely eager to avoid a new crisis at this time. Others, however, are stressing that since the community spirit was badly damaged by the recent crisis, any future agreements will be strictly a matter of quid pro quo.]

[The Germans may be doing themselves damage by insisting that agreement on agricultural financing is contingent on parallel progress on the Kennedy Round. The Belgians and Dutch are reportedly concerned that foot-dragging by Bonn on agricultural financing would place the Kennedy Round in grave jeopardy. In the Belgian view, moreover, Bonn will eventually have to reconcile its demands for high community farm prices with its unwillingness to pay for disposing of increased production.]

[The negotiating schedule ahead is a heavy one. Inasmuch as the Germans have reportedly now agreed that the farm financing question should be settled by 10 May at the latest, a failure to do so by that time will very likely leave the community once more in a critical situation.]

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East and Central Africa: It is becoming increasingly evident that last week's regional summit conference in Nairobi contrasted considerably with the unproductive African parleys of the past.

The assembled leaders of 11 east and central African states, each of whom has a dispute with at least one neighbor, managed to achieve an unusual measure of rapport and agreed on realistic steps to resolve their differences.

In plenary session they agreed that refugees should not be given press facilities, military training, or other aid that could be used against their home governments. Tanzania's President Nyerere was the target of complaints from several countries on this score. He agreed to circumscribe the activities of Malawi exiles in Tanzania. Chairman Kenyatta ordered the expulsion from Kenya of two Congolese rebel leaders and a roundup of southern Sudanese dissidents.

In several private conversations, the Congo's President Mobutu skillfully dispelled much of the lingering suspicion and hostility toward Leopoldville and reached agreement in principle with all participating neighbors to resolve their refugee problems. Both Nyerere and Uganda's Prime Minister Obote promised Mobutu that they would stop all aid to the Congolese rebels.

After the meeting, the Sudanese prime minister also visited Uganda, where he obtained an encouraging commitment from Obote to try to repatriate southern Sudanese exiles. Only the Somali Republic appears to have made no satisfactory progress in its disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya, although polite dialogue was initiated.

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NOTE

Ethiopia: Emperor Haile Selassie will leave Ethiopia next week on a three-week tour of West Africa and the Caribbean. His decision to make the trip apparently reflects confidence in the security of his rule despite the concern he had shown following the recent series of African military coups. Last month the Emperor made some political concessions to appease his critics. However, military and civilian elements are still dissatisfied with his authoritarian rule, and the possibility of a move against his regime during his absence cannot be ruled out.]

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